What happens when a buyer and a seller each have private information about the value of an item for trade, as is particularly common in real estate? We solve for the equilibrium price under both public information, where the seller shares his information with the buyer, and private information, where the seller is constrained to be unable to credibly share. Our main results are 1) even under public information, the equilibrium price differs from the expected value of the item, 2) under private information, prices follow a step function, with small changes in information generically having no effect on price, and 3) equilibrium price is more sensitive to informational changes under private information than public information. This under-studied game of 2-sided asymmetric information reasonably describes real estate transactions.
Introduction
A buyer and a seller bargain over an asset of uncertain value, such as real estate. Both have private information relevant to the value of the asset. The seller makes a takeit-or-leave-it offer, which the buyer either accepts or rejects. We characterize the function mapping the seller's private information into his optimal offer, under both public information (the seller credibly reveals his information) and private information. We find that even under public information the seller's optimal offer is less sensitive to variations in private information than is the expected value of the asset. Under private information, the game's only equilibrium is a step function, under which the seller charges one of several discrete prices, depending on his information. Most surprisingly, the average sensitivity of price to the seller's information is greater under private information than public information, meaning that the seller charges a relatively higher price given favorable information if his information is private. There is some evidence that the seller's profit is higher under public information, meaning that he would be willing to pay to credibly reveal his private information, even given the risk that this information will be unfavorable.
Markets in which both sides have private information have not been studied extensively. Some existing work has studied the propensity to settle a lawsuit when both sides have private information about their likelihood of success (Friedman and Wittman (2007) [1] , Daughety and Reinganum (1994) [2] ), bargaining over labor disputes (Kennan and Wilson (1993) [3] ), or the setting of point spreads in gambling markets (Sandford and Shea (2013 [4] ), Ottaviani and Sorenson (2006) [5] , and Steele and Zidek (1980) [6] ). This paper extends the framework of Sandford and Shea (2013) [4] , which finds the unexpected result that bookmakers do not optimally set gambling lines so that each side is equally likely to win when both the bookmaker and gambler have private information, to a real estate market, in which buyers and sellers negotiate over the price of an asset of uncertain value 1 . Our results on the relationship between optimal price and whether information is public or private, and on the elasticity between price and information are novel to the literature.
For the remainder of the paper we consider the case where Seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Buyer consisting of price p, which Buyer will either accept or reject, based on his private information. However, the model's results are qualitatively similar if we instead assume that Buyer makes the offer.
Buyer will accept the offer only if his information is sufficiently favorable, if 2 z z  for some z which depends on p and, if known to Seller, z 1 . Formally, payoffs are then as follows:
Buyer's strategy consists entirely of a choice of z , conditioned on p and, if available, z 1 . Seller's strategy consists of a price p, conditioned on z 1 . We first consider the case of public information, where z 1 is public information, known to both Buyer and Seller.
Public Information
Suppose Seller's information z 1 is known to Buyer, while z 2 is Buyer's private information. This may represent a case, for example, where Buyer's appraisals are able to successfully reveal all relevant information about the property, where Seller can commit to truthfully revealing his information, or it can emerge endogenously from a model in which Seller chooses whether or not to disclose and Buyer believes that any Seller who doesn't disclose z 1 has very bad information (low z 1 ), and so Seller is always better off by disclosing z 1 , regardless of its value.
Suppose that both z 1 and z 2 are independently uniformly distributed over [-1,1] Buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer, while he accepts (rejects) for z 2 greater than (less than)
For , ,
Equation (2) and the fact that z 2 is bounded between −1 and 1 establish the lemma. □ Seller takes Buyer's optimal strategy   1 , z p z as given in setting p. In maximizing his payoff, Seller considers the gain in setting a higher price (higher profit in the event Buyer accepts) against the cost (lower probability of acceptance). First, it is immediate that for sufficiently low A, Seller will never sell-he will set a high p so that Buyer rejects the offer. This is because for low A, Buyer accepts only if his private information suggests the value of the asset is worth more than p, in which case Seller would be better off keeping the land for himself. Second, it is clear that Seller's optimal price must be increasing in z 1 ; as Seller has more favorable public information, Buyer's willingness to pay and Seller's opportunity cost of selling both increase. Lemma 
Taking the derivative of (4) and setting to zero then yields (3) . That p  (z 1 ) is increasing in z 1 and decreasing in A follows from inspection of (3). That
We analyze the public information equilibrium by comparing p  (z 1 ) to two bench marks. First, we show that p  (z 1 ) has no consistent relationship with E(X|z 1 ). Second, in the next section, we compare the public information p  (z 1 ) with its counterpart when z 1 is Seller's private information, and cannot be credibly revealed.
First, a straightforward calculation shows that:
Consider the value of 
Equation (6) is decreasing in z 1 ; Seller extracts a higher price relative to the expected value of the asset when his information is unfavorable. To put another way, Seller's optimal price is less elastic in his own information than is the expected value of the asset. Figure 1 demonstrates an example where A = 0.2, implying that Seller obtains 25% less value from the property than Buyer, and that the average of
E X z     reflects the greater price sensitivity of the latter.
Private Information
We now consider the case of private information where z 1 is known only to Seller, and z 2 only to Buyer. In this case, the Seller's private knowledge from owning the property cannot be fully extracted by Buyer, and by assumption, Seller cannot credibly reveal z 1 to buyer.
We again solve the game backwards. Upon observing a price set by Seller, Buyer forms beliefs over the distribution of z 1 . Call this belief f(z 1 ), and let denote Buyer's expected value of z 1 based on a price of p. Again, Buyer will optimally accept an offer if and only if hissignal z 2 is above some threshold,
Lemma 3 establishes an analogue of Lemma 1 under private information, and describes the cutoff value of z 2 , above which Buyer accepts and below which Buyer rejects. z is shown to depend positively on p and negatively on . 
